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Pennsylvania's New Municipalities





The 1987-88 session of Pennsylvania's General Assembly pro-
duced unique, comprehensive, and creative approaches to some of
local government's most intractable problems. In the summer of
1987, Governor Robert P. Casey signed the Financially Distressed
Municipalities Act' in Clairton, Pennsylvania. This bill deals forth-
rightly with the financial crises confronting some of the Common-
wealth's nearly bankrupt local governments. Subsequently, in the fi-
nal hours of the two-year legislative session, lawmakers considered
an equally momentous proposal. A historic local tax reform package
was enacted, promising to free local government decision makers
from the outmoded, inflexible, and archaic tax structure, which re-
lied too heavily on various nuisance taxes and the real property tax.2
During the final sixty minutes prior to sine die adjournment,
when much of the drama concerning tax reform unfolded in the Sen-
ate,3 the House of Representatives approved and forwarded to Gov-
ernor Casey significant revisions to Pennsylvania's Municipalities
Planning Code (MPC).' This comprehensive revision of the statute
* Partner in the firm of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Former
Member Pennsylvania House of Representatives; Chairman, House Local Government Com-
mittee and Member of Local Government Commission. B.A. 1970, University of Pennsylvania;
M.A. 1971, University of Chicago; J.D. 1981, Dickinson School of Law.
** Legal Counsel, Pennsylvania Local Government Commission. B.A. 1968, Washing-
ton & Jefferson College; J.D. 1971, Dickinson School of Law.
1. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11701.101-.501 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
2. The constitutional amendment (Special Session House Bill 14, amending Article
VIII, sec. 2(b) of the Constitution of Pennsylvania) needed to trigger the tax reform statute
was overwhelmingly defeated in the May 16, 1989 primary. The demise of tax reform may
drive local governments more quickly to exactions and impact fees. The California experience
following the adoption of Proposition 13 is instructive. See Smith, From Subdivision Improve-
ment Requirement to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief His-
tory of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 19-24 (1987).
3. See Singel, As the Clock Ticked Away on Tax Reform, Pittsburgh Post Gazette,
Dec. 5, 1988, at 7, col. 1-4.
4. Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, No. 247, reenacted and amended by Act of Dec. 21,
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authorizes the regulation of land use by local government agencies,
including governing bodies, zoning hearing boards, and planning
commissions, and represents the culmination of work begun in 1981
by a blue-ribbon Task Force organized by the Local Government
Commission (Commission).' The Commission, a bicameral and bi-
partisan research agency of the Legislature, has substantial jurisdic-
tion over local government legislation and provides advice to the
General Assembly on municipal governmental affairs. The Commis-
sion comprises five members of the Pennsylvania House of Repre-
sentatives and five members of the Senate of Pennsylvania. A small
professional staff executes the policy decisions promulgated by the
Commission. One of the co-authors of this Article served as a mem-
ber of the Commission from 1983 to 1988, and the other co-author
currently serves as the Commission's legal counsel."
Although the proposed revision of the MPC did not attract
widespread statewide media attention, considerable controversy and
attendant debate preceded the proposal's eventual enactment. The
bill's seven year gestation period and difficult, painful birth reflect
the complexity of the topic and its day-to-day significance. Land use
control is a major function of Pennsylvania local governments, and
affects millions of the state's residents. The final version of the MPC
mirrors the varied pressures and desires for growth and development
in Pennsylvania, as well as the confusing intricacies of the legislative
process.
Perhaps even more than the power to tax, the power to regulate
the use of an individual's private property to further the public inter-
est generates one of the most profound tensions in our democracy.'
1988, P.L. 1329, No. 170; Municipalities Planning Code, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101-
11202 (Purdon Supp. 1989) [hereinafter MPCI.
5. In addition to the Commission's Task Force on the Municipalities Planning Code
(MPC), the Commission organized similar task forces to study and propose legislative solu-
tions. These efforts resulted in the Distressed Municipalities Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
11701.101-.501 (Purdon Supp. 1989). Additionally, the tax reform legislation incorporated, in
part, the Real Estate Assessment Task Force's final product.
6. This Article borrows extensively from the Commission's final report on the MPC.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, 172d Leg., 2d Sess., ANALYSIS OF REVISIONS TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPALITIES PLANNING CODE: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, LEGISLATIVE
INTENT, AND COMMENTARY ON AMENDMENTS ENACTED DURING 1987-88 LEGISLATIVE SES-
SION (Comm. Print Jan. 1989) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
7. Justice Frankfurter predicted that:
Yesterday, the active area in this field was concerned with "property." Today it
is "civil liberties." Tomorrow it may again be "property." Who can say that in a
society with a mixed economy like ours, these two areas are sharply separated,
and that certain freedoms in relation to property may not again be deemed, as
they were in the past, aspects of individual freedom.
F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 19 (1956).
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To paraphrase Chief Justice John Marshall's words in the landmark
opinion of McCulloch v. Maryland,8 the power to regulate can con-
stitute the power to destroy or seriously impair private property
rights.9 Skilled advocates cleverly and vigorously presented the argu-
ments for the respective rights in conflict. At every step along the
way, the advocates strongly and convincingly argued that a phrase,
or a seemingly technical amendment, could fundamentally tip the
fulcrum upon which the rights of private property and the pursuit of
the public interest are precariously balanced.' 0
This Article reviews the legislative history and process that re-
sulted in Act 170 of 1988, the revised Pennsylvania's Municipalities
Planning Code." The major changes in Pennsylvania land use law,
including the adoption of new concepts, the codification of appellate
court decisions, and the key points for immediate attention by practi-
tioners are underscored. Also highlighted are the occasional in-
stances in which the General Assembly made a policy decision that
reversed an appellate court precedent. Finally, this Article explores
the unresolved issue of local governments' right to impose fees upon
real estate developers for the impact that new housing places upon a
municipality.
One major reason for amending Act 247 of 1968 was to sim-
plify and streamline the MPC. Since 1968, the MPC has produced a
veritable flood of litigation over a host of both substantive and proce-
dural issues. 2 To answer what might seem to be the simplest ques-
tion regarding a procedural aspect of land use practice, a lawyer
must review numerous pages of annotations. Act 170 directly sets
forth the key definitions, rules of construction, appropriate proce-
dures, deadlines, and criteria for decision-making.
As noted, the General Assembly's prodigious efforts did not re-
solve the single most contentious issue placed before it-the so-called
impact fee. Various proposals authorizing the assessment of impact
fees on new development were proposed. However, on the final day
of the legislative session, it became abundantly clear that this bit-
terly contested dispute could not be settled. Therefore, the final ver-
sion, which was passed in the last tumultuous hour of the session,
contains no authorization for imposition of impact fees. This Article
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
9. Id. at 431.
10. Id. at 322.
11. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
12. See annotations collected at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972
& Supp. 1989).
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contains a review of the current state of the law in Pennsylvania,
analysis of prospects for legal challenge to the fees currently charged
by some municipalities, and prognosis for future judicial and legisla-
tive action.
II. The Roots of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Land Use
Regulation Law
On July 13, 1968, Governor Raymond P. Shafer signed Act 247
of 1968, the statewide enabling legislation for regulation of local
land use, zoning, and planning activities by municipal governing
bodies.1" That landmark legislation provided local governments with
the essential tools for crafting subdivision and land development or-
dinances, enacting zoning and planning legislation, and making ap-
pointments to planning commissions and zoning hearing boards. As
noted by former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Samuel J.
Roberts:
The Municipalities Planning Code is the Legislature's man-
date for the unified regulation of land use and development. The
Code also sets forth procedures by which landowners and others
may challenge municipal decision-making in this area. These
procedures are, in the Legislature's judgment, the best means of
balancing the interests of municipalities with those of land own-
ers and others. Commentators view the Municipalities Planning
Code's procedures for challenging local land regulations as a sig-
nificant advance over prior methods. 4
Despite several amendments adopted in 1972, 1978, and 1982, the
MPC remained substantially similar to its original format for twenty
years.
III. Historical Development of the New MPC
In 1981, the Local Government Commission organized a Task
Force to comprehensively study the MPC. 15 The Task Force under-
13. See supra note 4; 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972),
amended by 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
14. Gary D. Reihart, Inc. v. Carroll Township, 487 Pa. 461, 466, 409 A.2d 1167, 1170
(1979) (citing Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U.
PA. L. REV. 1029, 1093 (1972); Wolffe, Procedures Under the Pennsylvania Municipalities
Planning Code, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1975)).
15. The Members of the Commission's Task Force included:
Senator Tim Shaffer (Chairman of the Task Force)*; Senator J. Doyle Corman
(ex officio, Chairman of the Commission); Representative Joseph Levi I1*; Rep-
resentative David W. Sweet*; William Adams (Pennsylvania Farmer's Associa-
tion); Ronald Agulnick, Esq. (Chester and Delaware County Home Builders);
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took a section-by-section analysis of the MPC to remove inconsisten-
cies, clarify ambiguities, and standardize procedures. The Task
Force made a conscious and deliberate effort to analyze relevant ju-
dicial decisions concerning the MPC, and to avoid cavalierly over-
turning existing land use case law. However, new provisions were
proposed, including transferable development rights for more crea-
tive land use planning, and a mediation option to resolve certain land
use disputes.
The report of the Task Force was originally embodied in Senate
Bill 1168, Printer's No. 1546. The bill was introduced in the Penn-
sylvania Senate on November 30, 1983 and was widely distributed
for comment. Many technical and editorial amendments were made
by the Senate Local Government Committee, but the basic sub-
stance of the bill was not altered.
Senate Bill 1168, Printer's No. 2311, expired with the sine die
adjournment of the legislature on November 30, 1984. The bill was
redrafted with additional technical amendments and reintroduced in
the Senate in the 1985-86 legislative session.' 6 Further refinements
were proposed by the Commission staff and accepted by the Task
Force.
However, Senate Bill 876 also expired upon sine die adjourn-
ment of the legislature on November 26, 1986. The bill was reintro-
duced in the following session as Senate Bill 535.17 The Senate Local
Government Committee further amended the bill at its meeting on
February 2, 1988.18 The following month, on March 21, 1988, the
Senate adopted several other amendments on the bill's third consid-
eration on the floor of the Senate. The following day, by a vote of
45-2, the Senate passed the bill, as amended. 9
Following Senate approval, the bill was referred to the House
Local Government Committee, which appointed a special subcom-
mittee to study the Senate version, consider testimony, and review
Richard G. Bickel (AICP, American Planning Association); Frederick C. Brown
(Pennsylvania Association of Realtors); Loudon L. Campbell, Esq. (Pennsylva-
nia Builder's Association); Dallas A. Dollase (Department of Community Af-
fairs); Thomas W. Graney (Lawrence County Planning Commission); Elam
Herr (Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors); John P. Knox,
Esq. (Pennsylvania Bar Association); James R. Moore (Pennsylvania Manufac-
tured Housing Association); Ronald J. Mull (Pennsylvania State Association of
Township Commissioners); and Leslie E. Spaulding (Pennsylvania Planning
Association).
*No longer Members of the Local Government Commission.
16. S. 876, Printer's No. 1018, 169th Leg., 2d Sess. (1985).
17. S. 535, Printer's No. 588, 171st Leg., 1st Sess. (1987).
18. S. 535, Printer's No. 1758, 172d Leg., 1st Sess. (1988).
19. S. 535, Printer's No. 1880, 172d Leg., 1st Sess. (1988).
94 DiCKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
proposed amendments. Following numerous meetings, and a public
hearing in Bucks County, the subcommittee's report and recommen-
dations were considered by the full House Local Government Com-
mittee on September 27-28, 1988. The final product was reported to
the floor of the House on October 4, 1988.2
Lobbying efforts intensified during the two weeks following the
introduction of the bill to the House, primarily focusing upon the
proposed impact fee provisions. Extensive debates on many key
amendments occurred on the floor of the House on November 16,
1988.21 After the House passed several significant amendments by
extremely narrow margins, the bill achieved final passage by a vote
of 159-31. This version of the MPC22 was returned to the Senate for
concurrence in the House amendments.
As in the House, intense lobbying pressures were exerted in the
Senate by the same forces that continued to disagree about the pre-
cise final language of section 509(i) related to impact fees. Following
discussion among the Senate caucuses and key House members, a
compromise proposal emerged that would eliminate all reference to
impact fees. Although no one appeared fully satisfied by this deci-
sion, at least the important aspects of the remaining MPC revisions
could be salvaged. Following excision of proposed section 509(i), the
Senate concurred in all other House amendments on November 29,
1988, by a vote of 46-3.
13
House concurrence in the total deletion of all impact fee lan-
guage was, therefore, left to the final day of session prior to sine die
adjournment. One last effort to kill this legislation was made on the
House floor late in the evening of November 30, 1988. A motion to
revert to the prior printer's number, which included the House-
passed impact fee provisions, failed by a thirty-vote margin.2  The
20. S. 535, Printer's No. 2428, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (1988).
21. 64 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 1831-1856, 172d Leg., 1988 Sess. (Nov. 16, 1988).
22. S. 535, Printer's No. 2514, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (1988).
23. Senate amendment to House amendments is unusual, but not entirely unheard of,
particularly near the end of legislative sessions. However, recent shortcuts instituted in the
name of legislative craftsmanship, including unusual manipulation of the rules and violation of
constitutionally mandated procedures, have been struck down by the courts. See Pennsylvania
Ass'n of Retail Dealers v. Commonwealth, - Pa. Commw. -, 554 A.2d 998 (1989);
Parker v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. Commw. 93, 540 A.2d 313 (1988); Ritter v. Common-
wealth, 120 Pa. Commw. 374, 548 A.2d 1317 (1988). These recent cases considered alleged
violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, article IIl, sections 2 and 4, and the adjudication
of the issues of germaneness and nonjusticiability of co-equal branches of the government.
24. This motion to suspend the House rules and revert to previous printer's number 2514
was immensely significant since it would have dealt a death knell to the MPC because the
Senate was embroiled in an eleventh hour debate on local tax reform, and would not have been
able to vote on this late House action.
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final concurrence vote was 133-58.25 Governor Robert P. Casey
signed Act 170 on December 21, 1988, and the Act became effective
on February 21, 1989.
IV. New Concepts Embodied in the MPC
A. Transferable Development Rights
One of the several innovative concepts adopted by the General
Assembly in the new MPC is transferable development rights, or
TDRs. A TDR is a planning concept that permits a municipality, in
its zoning ordinance, to recognize development rights that are sever-
able and separately conveyable as another estate in land.26 This pro-
vision allows a municipality to encourage local development in a
manner more reasonably related to the best interests of the
community.
2 7
Although TDRs were initially developed twenty years ago, the
concept has caught on rather slowly. TDRs were employed success-
fully to preserve historic landmarks in New York City28 and to pro-
tect coastal wetlands in Collier County, Florida.2 9 In addition, TDRs
have been used to protect woodlands, streams, and farmland in the
Pine Barrens of New Jersey.s" The implementation of the new MPC
may result in greater nationwide acceptance of TDRs. However,
there are many potentially serious criticisms made of TDRs' usage:
Aside from the possible equal protection problems sur-
rounding the artificial creation and distribution of wealth in the
form of development rights, it is suggested that many municipal-
ities may be reluctant to play "Robin Hood" and may shy away
from implementation of a full-scale TDR plan. It is not hard to
imagine the potential administrative headaches involved in a
full-scale TDR plan. Simply determining the number of rights
to be created and allocated assumes that a municipality can ac-
curately predict future growth pressures, a highly speculative
prospect. Furthermore, unless all municipalities in a region co-
operate in a regional TDR scheme, the price of a development
25. S. 535, Printer's No. 2556, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (1988).
26. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10107,
10619.1 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
27. Appeal of Buckingham Developers, Inc., 61 Pa. Commw. 408, 433 A.2d 931 (1981)
(noted use of TDRs, but did not reach the merits of the issue in the final adjudication).
28. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 883 (1978).
29. Office of Environmental Management, City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, Public In-
formation Brochure (Dec. 1988) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
30. Id.
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right may be unrealistically low, since a developer may have the
option to build in a neighboring township where rights need not
be purchased at all, or where, due to an over-issue of develop-
ment rights, the price is depressed. In short, the highly artificial
market and potential inequities connected with initiation of a
full-scale TDR program might lead to a virtual Pandora's Box
of undesirable and unforeseen side effects. For that reason, the
effectiveness of TDR as a method for preserving farmland is
highly questionable.-1
We predict that Pennsylvania's local governing bodies will be slow to
adopt TDRs.
B. Civil Enforcement Remedies
The Task Force's belief that the prior MPC inappropriately im-
posed criminal sanctions for violations of a subdivision or zoning or-
dinance prompted the amendments and changes to articles V, VI,
and VII of the MPC."2 For example, a zoning violation involving a
default of the prescribed monetary fine resulted in imprisonment of
not more than 60 days under the old MPC.33
The Task Force, the Senate, and the House all contributed to a
substantial rewording of these provisions. In the revised MPC, refer-
ences to fines and contempt citations are deleted and replaced by
civil judgments, imposition of costs and attorney fees, and enforce-
ment of defaults through applicable rules of civil procedure. District
justices have initial jurisdiction for all proceedings brought under
these provisions."4
A municipality may also institute actions at law or in equity to
restrain, correct, or abate violations and to prevent unlawful con-
struction or occupancy, as well as recover damages.3 5 In addition,
local officials may refuse to issue any permit or grant any approval
to develop land that has been developed or subdivided in violation of
an ordinance adopted pursuant to the MPC. 6 This authority is ap-
propriate whether the applicant is an owner, vendee, or lessee at the
time of the violation or subsequent to the time of the violation, and is
31. Chestek, Farmland Preservation Techniques: Some Food for Thought, 40 U. PITT.
L. REV. 258, 278-79 (1979).
32. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10501-10515.3, 10601-10619.1, 10701-10713 (Pur-
don Supp. 1989).
33. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10616 (Purdon 1972), repealed by 53 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 10616 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
34. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10515.2, 10617.1, 10712.1 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
35. See. e.g., id. at § 10515.1(a).
36. Id. at § 10515.1(b).
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applicable whether the applicant had either actual or constructive
notice of the violation. 7
The major change in the enforcement remedies sections elimi-
nates the criminal penalty for subdivision and land development or-
dinance violations and substitutes a civil judgment procedure. Liabil-
ity for a violation results in a civil judgment of not more than $500
plus costs and attorney fees incurred by the municipality.38 No viola-
tion, however, is deemed to have occurred, nor any judgment com-
menced, imposed, or payable until a final determination is made by
the district justice.39 In case the defendant "neither pays nor timely
appeals the judgment, the municipality may enforce the judgment
pursuant to the applicable rules of civil procedure."' 0
Essentially, this provision reclassifies subdivision violations from
a misdemeanor to a civil penalty, which avoids the cumbersome, ex-
pensive, and unworkable process necessarily associated with the use
of criminal proceedings to enforce subdivision or zoning regulations.
The authority to institute such proceedings is limited to the munici-
pality and does not extend to private citizens."'
C. Mediation Option
A new section of the MPC provides a mediation option as a
supplement to proceedings initiated under MPC articles IX, Zoning
Hearing Board and Other Administrative Proceedings, and X-A,
Appeals to Court.42 Mediation is not mandatory; the municipality
may choose to offer mediation, and any party may refuse to partici-
pate."3 This new process is not a substitute for the proceedings re-
quired by articles IX and X-A of the MPC." Current legal process
for the resolution of land use disputes continues to exist as a matter
of right. Mediation is not intended to subvert the letter of the law
but only to facilitate settlement. The MPC specifically prohibits the
zoning hearing board from initiating or participating as a party in
mediation."'
In order to encourage use of the mediation process, the MPC
prohibits the evidentiary use of any offers or statements made during
37. Id.
38. Id. at § 10515.3(a).
39. 53 PA, CONS. STAT, ANN. § 10515.3(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
40. Id.
41. Id. at § 10515.3(c).
42. Id. at § 10908.1.
43. Id. at § 10908.1(b).
44. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10908.1(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
45. Id. at § 10908.1(a).
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mediation in any subsequent judicial or administrative proceeding."6
Anticipated benefits of offering mediation include: (1) assistance in
relieving an overburdened court system; (2) support for a public pol-
icy in Pennsylvania that encourages out-of-court settlements; (3)
providing a potentially less costly, more effective mechanism for
resolving land use disputes; and (4) providing a less polarized process
than that which an adversarial administrative hearing and legal pro-
ceedings tend to create.
D. Regional Municipal Relationships
The amendments to the MPC clarify provisions that require
consideration of the relationship of the municipality's development to
surrounding units of local government and areas. The new language
of the Act establishes the interrelationship between existing and pro-
posed development of a municipality and (1) existing and proposed
development of contiguous municipalities; (2) county development
objectives and plans; and (3) regional trends, whether sociological,
economic, demographic, ecological, or otherwise. Since municipal
land use planning more and more frequently adversely affects devel-
opment objectives of adjacent municipalities and the surrounding re-
gion, this provision is intended to encourage consideration of adja-
cent community, county, and regional planning objectives along with
informal cooperation on land use planning matters.
The Task Force concerns for insuring coordination of the plan-
ning function between and among adjacent municipalities were
adopted by the MPC. 1 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
judicially recognized and confirmed these desires for cooperation
when the court overruled previous opinions and held that aggrieved
nonresidents of a municipality could appeal or intervene in zoning
decisions made within the boundary of an adjacent unit of local
government. 8
V. Legislative Codification or Reversal of Caselaw
One of the important goals of the drafters of the new MPC was
to legislatively codify appropriate common pleas and appellate deci-
sions. Also, in some instances, the drafters decided to reverse or
modify a judicial decree, and occasionally, addressed and resolved a
46. Id. at § 10908.1(c).
47. See, e.g., id. at §§ 10301(a)(5), 10503(7).
48. Miller v. Upper Allen Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 112 Pa. Commw. 274, 535
A.2d 1195 (1987).
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problem highlighted by a court case. Key members and staff in both
chambers of the legislature analyzed important judicial opinions, and
crafted language to accurately reflect these legal tenets.
A. Subdivision and Land Development
1. Section 107.-The definition of subdivision has been
amended to include any "petition by the court for distribution to
heirs or devisees,"' 9 overruling a Lehigh County Common Pleas de-
cision that held that such partitions and distributions did not consti-
tute a "subdivision." 5
2. Section 503(4.1).-This provision was added to enable those
municipalities that have not enacted a zoning ordinance to provide
for uniform setback lines and minimum lot sizes, and provides that
an ordinance may include: "Provisions which apply uniformly
throughout the municipality regulating minimum setback lines and
minimum lot sizes which are based upon the availability of water
and sewage, in the event the municipality has not enacted a zoning
ordinance."51 The Commonwealth Court previously ruled that these
regulations were invalid without enactment of a zoning ordinance.52
Now, a municipality without a zoning ordinance may still provide
for setbacks and minimum lot sizes.
3. Section 503(9).-This new clause states that a municipality
may impose conditions for the approval of plats, whether preliminary
or final.53 The provision also requires that the municipality establish
a procedure for an applicant's acceptance or rejection of condi-
tions.54 This provision delineates the authority of a municipality to
impose prerequisites for subdivision and land development approvals,
but equitably gives a developer the opportunity to notify the munici-
pality of either the rejection or acceptance of the conditions. A de-
veloper's rejection of the conditions will be deemed a disapproval of
the application for which the municipality must render a written de-
cision pursuant to section 508(1) and section 508(2).11
49. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10107 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
50. In re Estate of Tettemer, 26 D. & C.3d 745 (1981), affd, 311 Pa. Super. 635, 458
A.2d 287 (1983).
51. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10503(4.1) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
52. Board of Supervisors of Franklin Township v. Meals, 57 Pa. Commw. 129, 426 A.2d
1200 (1981).
53. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10503(9) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
54. Id.
55. Id. at §§ 10508(l)-(2); see Board of Comm'rs of Annville Township v. Livengood,
44 Pa. Commw. 336, 403 A.2d 1055 (1979).
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B. Zoning
1. Section 603(a).-This provision provides that: "Zoning or-
dinances should reflect the policy goals of the statement of commu-
nity development objectives required in section 606, and give consid-
eration to the character of the municipality, the needs of the citizens
and the suitabilities and special nature of particular parts of the mu-
nicipality."66 The House Local Government Committee inserted this
language, which states that zoning ordinances "should" reflect the
policy goals enunciated in the statement of community development
objectives. This new subsection may serve to modify court decisions
holding that a municipality's statement of community development
objectives should never serve as a basis to challenge the validity or
effect of its zoning ordinance.
2. Section 603(d).-This new subsection allows zoning ordi-
nances to include provisions regulating siting, density, and design of
developments to assure reliable, safe, and adequate water supplies to
support the intended use of the land.6 For more than twenty years,
Pennsylvania appellate courts have been confronted with the adjudi-
cation of legal issues created by large-lot zoning techniques of local
governments seeking to protect the watershed against pollution. The
courts have traditionally held, however, that municipalities may not
utilize large minimum lot sizes to effectuate exclusionary motives of
land use regulation. 9
3. Section 603.1.-This new section is added to provide a
statement of intent to assist in the interpretation of zoning provisions
when the meaning of local statutory language adopted by a gov-
erning body is questioned. This provision restates current law as
clearly and unequivocally enunciated by the appellate courts of the
Commonwealth in numerous decisions. 60 Municipal officials should
be cognizant that the provision provides that when doubt exists as to
the intention of the governing body, the language of the local zoning
56. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
57. See McClimans v. Board of Supervisors of Shenango Township, 107 Pa. Commw.
542, 529 A.2d 562 (1987); Appeal of deBotton, 81 Pa. Commw. 513, 474 A.2d 706 (1984).
58. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603(d) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
59. See Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land
& Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965);
Martin v. Millcreek Township, 50 Pa. Commw. 249, 413 A.2d 764 (1980). These cases re-
ferred generally to the issue of whether local zoning strategies based upon an announced need
to protect available water supplies constitute an extraordinary justification to public interest so
as to require large minimum lot sizes for on-site sewage.
60. See Appeal of Haff, 68 Pa. Commw. 112, 448 A.2d 120 (1982); Gilbert v. Mont-
gomery Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 58 Pa. Commw. 296, 427 A.2d 776 (1981); Cook v.
Marple Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 55 Pa. Commw. 535, 423 A.2d 1105 (1980).
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ordinance shall be interpreted in favor of the property owner and
against any implied extension of the restriction.61 The judicial con-
cept of rule of strict construction is, therefore, applicable.62
4. Section 604(4).-This clause is added to emphasize the im-
portance of providing for varied types of housing through zoning.
The clause states that zoning ordinances shall be designed to provide
for single- and multi-family dwellings, and provides that no zoning
ordinance shall be declared invalid for not listing other classifications
of dwellings.63 Once again, the legislative intent appears to be conso-
nant with judicial standards established by Pennsylvania appellate
courts.6 '
There was considerable dispute over this provision, with the
Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors (PSATS)
strongly objecting to a shopping list approach to zoning. The
PSATS' criticism was directed toward an earlier draft of the Task
Force proposal that required more specific dwelling types including:
single-family detached; single-family semi-detached; two-family de-
tached; townhouses and similar single-family dwellings; multi-family
dwellings in various arrangements; and, mobile homes and mobile
home parks. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in several de-
cisions, backed away from mandating different dwelling types to this
degree of specificity,6 5 the House Local Government Committee
amended the proposal to require: "residential housing of various
dwelling types encompassing all basic forms of housing, including
single-family and two-family dwellings, and a reasonable range of
multifamily dwellings in various arrangements, mobile homes, and
61. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603.1 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
62. The legislative intent was not to engender a companion rule that an ordinance grant-
ing rights with respect to a nonconforming use should be strictly construed against the land-
owner. The restatement of the strict construction rule was intended to reiterate, and not to
modify, the judicial rules concerning nonconformances.
63. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10604(4).
64. In Fernley v. Board of Supervisors of Schuylkill Township, 509 Pa. 413, 502 A.2d
585 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that totally excluded
apartments within the community. Eight years earlier, in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of
Upper Providence Township, 476 Pa. 182, 189, 382 A.2d 105, 108 (1977), the court "adopted
the 'fair share' principle, which requires local political units to plan for and provide land use
regulations which meet the legitimate needs of all categories of people who may desire to live
within its boundaries." Among the factors involved in the "fair share" analysis are the per-
centage of land available for a requested use, current population growth and pressures within
the municipality and surrounding region, and the amount of undeveloped land in a community.
Id.
65. See Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983); Appeal of M.A.
Kravitz Co., Inc., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983) (plurality opinion). These cases are
thoughtfully analyzed in I R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 3.5.2-.9
(Supp. 1986).
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mobile home parks . . . ."6 The legislative goal was to codify inclu-
sionary zoning principles without requiring more than the court had
determined was constitutionally necessary.67
5. Section 609.1.-This section was amended with respect to
the effect to be given a situation in which a landowner seeks to chal-
lenge the validity of a zoning ordinance by suggesting an amendment
designed to cure an alleged defect. If the curative amendment is re-
jected by a local governing body, but subsequently deemed meritori-
ous by the court, only the ordinance provisions relating to the land-
owner's challenge, and not the entire ordinance, shall be invalid."
This amendment effectively codifies an entire line of Pennsylvania
appellate court decisions related to this issue. 9
This new provision of section 609.1 ensures that an entire zon-
ing ordinance will not be invalidated and, therefore, will not leave a
municipality wholly without zoning protection. Likewise, the provi-
sion offers a legal safeguard against the absurd results present when
a challenger seeks to take advantage of a vulnerable unit of local
government.
The entire exclusionary zoning doctrine is an unusual one, for it
permits an owner to use his land in a manner prohibited by the
zoning ordinance not because the ordinance is unduly restrictive
as to his land, but because the ordinance is exclusionary. In
this respect it is a little like the rule which permits a publisher
of hardcore pornography to attack an anti-pornography statute
on vagueness grounds even though his particular publication
clearly could have been prohibited. The reason for rules which
66. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10604(4) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). Sec-
tion 604(4) is consistent with R. RYAN, supra note 65, at § 3.5.2, which states: "It is now clear
that a municipality must make provision for all 'basic forms' of housing, whether or not the
municipality is in the path of development . . . . [thus] ... [a] total exclusion of a basic
form of housing cannot be justified."
67. The court in Fernley v. Board of Supervisors of Schuylkill Township, 509 Pa. 413,
419, 502 A.2d 585, 588 (1985), essentially identified this listing as basic forms of housing and
indicated that when a zoning ordinance "totally excludes a basic form of housing such as
apartments," one need not even consider analysis of the fair share principles espoused in Sur-
rick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence Township, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977),
but rather can determine that such a total exclusion is unconstitutional. Therefore, it would
appear that the most recent decisions cited in Fernley that cited Surrick stand for the proposi-
tion that the language of § 604(4) sets forth constitutionally appropriate and valid statutory
provisions for basic forms of housing that should be available in all municipalities throughout
the Commonwealth.
68. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10609.1 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
69. See Cracas v. Board of Supervisors of West Pikeland Township, 89 Pa. Commw.
424, 492 A.2d 798 (1985); Appeal of Kasorex, 70 Pa. Commw. 193, 452 A.2d 921 (1982);
Greenwood Township v. Kefo, Inc., 52 Pa. Commw. 367, 416 A.2d 583 (1980); Davis v. Board
of Supervisors of Easttown Township, 32 Pa. Commw. 343, 379 A.2d 645 (1977).
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permit one who has not been injured by an ordinance to attack
it because of injury to others is to give an incentive to attack
invalid ordinances. But that incentive should be extended only
to attacks which involve the validity itself. If an ordinance ex-
cludes mobile home parks, then it makes some sense to say that
remedies should be fashioned in a way which encourages attacks
on that ground. But there is little sense in saying that because a
zoning ordinance improperly excludes mobile home parks, a de-
veloper should be permitted to erect a slaughter house in a resi-
dential zone. Where an ordinance has been held invalid because
it excludes multi-family dwellings, then that invalidity can be
used by other multi-family developers . . . .However, there is
no general rule that a statute which has an invalid provision is
invalid in all respects."
C. Planned Residential Development
The primary change in Planned Residential Development
(PRD) legislation is that within five years of the revised MPC's en-
actment, PRD ordinances are to be implemented only through provi-
sions within a zoning ordinance and not separately.7' Section 703 of
article VII was amended by changing references from "shall" to
"may" when describing the relationship between PRD applications
and the comprehensive plan.72 This change enabled the section to
comport with a Commonwealth Court ruling that "inconsistencies
with the . . . comprehensive plan did not strike a fatal blow to the
[PRD developer's] application. '7' These changes also add statutory
authority for the consideration of statements of community develop-
ment objectives and statements of municipal legislative findings.
D. Joint Municipal Zoning
Article VIII-A of the new MPC is a new section intended to
facilitate regional zoning when desired by participating local gov-
erning bodies. The article establishes some basic ground rules for
joining and seceding from a regional land use regulatory entity.
Specifically, the provisions of section 808-A require a munici-
pality to remain a member of a regional zoning venture for at least
70. R. RYAN, supra note 65, at § 3.5.15 (emphasis added).
71. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10702, 10713 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
72. Id.
73. Michaels Dev. Co., Inc. v. Benzinger Township Bd. of Supervisors, 50 Pa. Commw.
281, 413 A.2d 743 (1980).
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three years from the date of initial entry into the organization.7"
These provisions for binding regional zoning reflect judicial concerns
expressed as dicta in Nicholas, Heim, & Kissinger v. Township of
Harris.75 In Harris, although the township was a member of a re-
gional planning commission, no regional zoning ordinance existed. 76
The court suggested "that it might be a very good thing for the Gen-
eral Assembly to empower municipalities to enter into binding re-
gional zoning arrangements" in order to provide for a regional "fair
share" of various housing needs over the acreage of several adjacent
municipalities.77 Section 811-A also relates to the Harris dicta be-
cause this section authorizes courts to review regional zoning not
only within individual member municipalities but also within the
zoned regions' entire geographic boundaries. 8
E. Zoning Hearing Board and Other Administrative Proceedings
Section 915.1(d) of the revised MPC offers the opportunity for
an adjudication to impose reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney
fees upon a party to a zoning appeal who challenges a landowner's
requested relief and refuses to post a bond if the appellate court sus-
tains the lower court's order requiring that a bond be posted.79 This
new section, intended to deter frivolous appeals, may have resulted
from the Pennsylvania Superior Court's recent decision in Appeal of
Affected & Aggrieved Residents from Adverse Action of Supervi-
sors of Whitpain Township."
In Whitpain, a landowner who sought rezoning of his land from
residential to industrial use was continuously challenged by neigh-
boring residents.8 1 The residents failed to post a bond, and the land-
owner sought remuneration for extensive legal fees incurred in the
ongoing dispute with the allegedly aggrieved neighbors."
Even though the lower court lacked jurisdiction of the issue, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court entertained the landowner's appeal be-
cause of the "interests of judicial economy" and "the unique circum-
stances of [the] case."83 The court ruled against the landowner, find-
74. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10808-A(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
75. 31 Pa. Commw. 357, 375 A.2d 1383 (1977).
76. Id. at 362, 375 A.2d at 1385.
77. Id.
78. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10811-A (Purdon Supp. 1989).
79. Id. at § 10915.1(d).
80. 325 Pa. Super. 8, 472 A.2d 619 (1984).
81. Id. at 11-12, 472 A.2d at 620-21.
82. Id. at 12, 472 A.2d at 621.
83. Id. at 15, 472 A.2d at 622.
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ing that the "frivolous" appeals did not necessarily entail "arbitrary,
vexatious or bad faith" actions on the part of the residents in ongo-
ing challenges to the landowner's rezoning requests.84 Although the
prior MPC did not provide a remedy for an allegedly harassed land-
owner, section 915.1(d) addresses the landowner's concerns and of-
fers statutory authority for reversal of Whitpain.
F. Appeals to Court
The initial Task Force proposal contained language prohibiting
a common pleas judge from remanding an appeal to the deciding
body for further hearings or other proceedings, thus requiring the
common pleas judge to dispose of the matter. Any new findings of
fact elicited through evidentiary hearings were to be conducted
before the trial court. However, both appellate and trial court judges
expressed opposition to this provision, resulting in its deletion from
the bill by the House Local Government Committee. Section 1005-A
of the MPC allows the trial judge to remand the case "to the body,
agency or officer whose decision or order has been brought for re-
view, or may refer the case to a referee to receive additional evi-
dence, ' 85 except that appeals regarding validity of ordinances are
not remanded.8 The new MPC continues to agree with judicial find-
ings that there is "a useful purpose to be served by remand."8
VI. Key Points for Practitioners
Following are some items that every practitioner of municipal
law, and particularly municipal solicitors, should immediately
review. 8
A. Zoning Ordinance Amendments
1. Previously, advertisements of public hearings required prior
to the enactment of zoning ordinance amendments had to appear
twice during a period fourteen to thirty days prior to the public hear-
ing.89 Now, an advertisement must be published twice seven to thirty
84. Id. at 16-17, 472 A.2d at 623.
85. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § l1005-A (Purdon Supp. 1989).
86. Id.
87. Bridgeview Apartments, Inc. v. Brady, 31 Pa. Commw. 126, 375 A.2d 854 (1977).
88. This section of the Article borrows extensively from an excellent memorandum by
Blaine Allen Lucas, Esq., of the Pittsburgh law firm of Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebeneck,
Eck & Hall. Lucas, The Municipalities Planning Code Revisions: A Solicitor's Checklist, 29
THE PENNSYLVANIAN 10-1I, 20 (May 1989) (prepared for a presentation to the Municipal
Law Section of the Allegheny County Bar Association).
89. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10107(18) (Purdon 1972), amended by 53 PA. CONS.
94 DiCKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
days prior to said hearing.90
2. The advertisement of a proposed amendment to an ordinance
must appear seven to sixty days prior to passage.91
3. If the advertisement of the proposed amendment is to be in
summary form instead of full text, the following new requirements
apply:
(a) The solicitor must prepare the summary;
(b) A copy of the full ordinance must be supplied to a newspa-
per of general circulation; and
(c) An attested copy is required to be filed with the county law
library.92
4. If there are substantial modifications to the proposed amend-
ment after the required public hearing, the new statute requires:
(a) That another public hearing be conducted, advertisement of
the hearing appearing twice within a period of seven to thirty days
prior to the hearing;93 and
(b) The modified ordinance must be readvertised by summary
at least ten days prior to enactment.
94
5. Any proposed zoning map change must be posted on the af-
fected property at least one week prior to the public hearing.9 5
6. Within thirty days of the enactment of zoning ordinance
amendments, a copy of the amendments must be filed with the
county planning agency.96
7. The notice requirements listed above for zoning ordinance
amendments are similarly changed and required for subdivision and
PRD ordinance amendments.
B. Zoning Enforcement Actions
1. Any enforcement action must be preceded by appropriate no-
tice which, inter alia, includes specific reference to the right to ap-
peal the enforcement action to the zoning hearing board within the
time specified by the local zoning ordinance.97
2. Any judgment obtained from a district justice may com-
mence no sooner than determination of the judgment and, therefore,
STAT. ANN. § 10107 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
90. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10107 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
91. Id. at § 10610(a).
92. Id.
93. See id. at §§ 10107, 10609(d).
94. Id. at § 10610(b).
95. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10609(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
96. Id. at § 10609(g).
97. Id. at § 10616.1.
MUNICIPALITIES PLANNING CODE
has no retroactive effect. Fines are to be imposed on a per diem basis
and begin immediately upon judgment for continuing violations. If
there is a finding of good faith, the per diem violation is assessed
only once until the fifth day following said determination.98
3. If the action of the district justice is appealed to the court of
common pleas, the common pleas court may, upon petition, order
stay of the per diem fines pending final adjudication.99
4. Judgments obtained at the district justice level shall include
all court costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.1"'
5. Enforcement remedies for subdivision and PRD ordinance vi-
olations are generally the same as those for zoning ordinance viola-
tions except for the following:
(a) Unlike zoning violations, the new MPC contains no specific
provision for third parties bringing equity actions for violation of
subdivision or PRD ordinances; and
(b) Municipalities are granted additional authority to withhold
permit approvals on sites where development has occurred in viola-
tion of a subdivision ordinance. 1 '
C. Zoning Administration
The new MPC is abundantly clear that the municipal solicitor,
although permitted to represent the planning commission, may not
represent the same municipality's zoning hearing board. 02 This pro-
vision codifies existing case law.'
D. Zoning Hearing Board Proceedings
1. The new MPC permits compensation for the secretary and
members of the zoning hearing board, notice and advertising costs,
and necessary administrative overhead expenses to be included
within the locally approved application fees. 04 Such fees may not
include professional expenses, such as legal, engineering, architec-
tural, consultant, and expert witness costs. 10 5 Thus, although the rea-
98. Id. at § 10617.2(a).
99. Id. at § 10617.2(b).
100. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10617.2(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
101. Id. at § 10515.1(b).
102. See id. at § 10617.3(c).
103. See Horn v. Township of Hilton, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975); Gardner v.
Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969); Sultanik v. Board of Supervisors of Worcester
Township, 88 Pa. Commw. 214, 488 A.2d 1197 (1985).
104. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10908(1.1) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
105. Id.
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sonableness standard that existed in prior law is maintained, the spe-
cific items for which fees may be charged has been modified.
2. A stenographic record of zoning hearing board proceedings
remains required, but the expenses are apportioned as follows:
(a) The stenographer's appearance fee is to be divided equally
between the applicant and the zoning hearing board.
(b) The cost of the original transcript shall be borne by the zon-
ing hearing board if ordered by the board or by the party appealing
from the board's decision.
(c) The cost of any additional copies of the transcript shall be
borne by the party requesting copies.106
3. If a hearing officer is used by the zoning hearing board, the
board must render its decision within thirty days after the hearing
officer's report has been received by the board."' Prior law permit-
ted forty-five days for such review and decision.1
08
E. Stays/Bonds
When a party who has prevailed at the local government level
seeks to have a bond imposed by the court on an appellant, the ap-
pellee no longer needs to establish to the court's satisfaction that the
appeal has been filed "for the purposes of delay."'0 9
F. Substantive Validity Challenges
When a substantive validity challenge is before the governing
body, the municipal solicitor's role is to represent the governing
body. The governing body is permitted to retain independent counsel
to defend the challenged ordinance."10
G. Jurisdiction Over Appeals
1. All procedural challenges now go initially to the zoning hear-
106. Id. at § 10908(7). Section 908(7) of the MPC changed the law with respect to
financial responsibility for stenographic fees in zoning hearing board proceedings. The munici-
pality will no longer bear the full cost of the original transcript with the applicant only being
charged for the reasonable cost of a copy as upheld by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylva-
nia in Appeal of Mark-Gardner Assocs., Inc., 50 Pa. Commw. 354, 413 A.2d 1142 (1980); In
re Appeal of Martin, 33 Pa. Commw. 303, 381 A.2d 1321 (1978). In this particular instance,
the General Assembly invoked its fundamental prerogative to change the law.
107. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10908(9) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
108. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10908(9) (Purdon 1972), amended by 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 10908(9) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
109. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11008(4) (Purdon 1972), amended by 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 11003-A(d) (Purdon Supp. 1989); annotations compiled in 53 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 11008 (Purdon 1972) (repealed 1988).
110. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10916.1(a)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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ing board. Such challenges to the procedure by which a zoning ordi-
nance or amendment was enacted must be brought within thirty
days of said enactment."1
2. All appeals from the governing body's denial of a subdivision
request are to be taken to common pleas court. 1" 2 Previously only
landowner appeals were heard by the common pleas court; person-
aggrieved appeals were first heard by the zoning hearing board." 3
3. Similarly all appeals from decisions regarding Planned Resi-
dential Development ordinances also go to common pleas court."'
4. All appeals regarding decisions by the governing body on
conditional uses go directly to common pleas court." 5
5. Appeals arising from a zoning enforcement notice are taken
to the zoning hearing board."'
6. All administrative determinations regarding flood plain man-
agement, storm water management, sediment and erosion control
will now be taken to the zoning hearing board." 7 However, if these
arise under a subdivision or PRD request, said appeals are taken to
common pleas court.
H. Subdivisions
Provisions regarding the payment of expenses incurred by the
municipality's professional engineer or consultant in reviewing plans
are to be established by ordinance or resolution."' An applicant may
dispute the amount of the fee by notifying the municipality within
ten days of the billing date." 9 An arbitration mechanism is estab-
lished to resolve those disputes. 20
I. Completion of Improvement-Municipal Resolution
In order to facilitate developer financing, at the developer's re-
quest, a municipality must provide a signed copy of the resolution
indicating final plat approval to the developer who can then provide
such copy to the lender.' 2' Said plat approval may be given contin-
Ill. Id. at § 10909.1(a)(2).
112. Id. at § 11002-A.
113. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11004, 11005 (Purdon 1972) (repealed 1988).
114. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11002-A (Purdon Supp. 1989).
115. Id.
116. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10909.1 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
117. Id.
118. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10503 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
119. Id.
120. See id. at §§ 10503, 10510(g).
121. Id. at § 10509(b).
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gent upon receipt of evidence by the developer of satisfactory finan-
cial security. 22
J. Completion Bond
1. A completion bond, still valued at 1 10 percent as under prior
law, is to be calculated based on the estimated cost of completion as
of ninety days after the scheduled completion date.'23 The calcula-
tion of the financial security is to be based upon estimates submitted
by the applicant and prepared by a professional engineer. 24 The mu-
nicipality may refuse to honor this estimate based upon the munici-
pal engineer's recommendation.' 5 An inability to reach agreement
on this matter results in resolution of the impasse through an arbi-
tration procedure conducted by a mutually agreeable third
engineer.
2 6
2. Similarly, by resolution or ordinance, the municipality may
prescribe the schedule for inspection fees based on the ordinary and
customary fees charged by the municipal engineer.'27 If an applicant
disputes the outlined fees, an arbitration mechanism is provided. 28
VII. Impact Fees and Exactions
The single most controversial issue raised by the comprehensive
revisions to the MPC was the so-called impact fee. Since resolution
of this issue was ultimately deferred, it is instructive to explore the
legal, political, and legislative issues involved in the imposition of
such fees.' 29 First, it is important to define the terms used since the
labels have come to mean different things to different interest
groups. For purposes of our analysis, an impact fee is a single pay-
ment required to be made by a builder/developer at the time of de-
velopment approval. The fee is purported to be a proportionate share
of the capital cost of off-site infrastructure improvements needed to
serve the new development and to cushion the impact of growth on
the existing public facilities and services of the municipality.
122. Id.
123. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10509(f) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
124. Id. at § 10509(g).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at § 10510(g).
128. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10510(g) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
129. See Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Per-
spective, 20 URB. LAW. 515 (1988), in which impact fees are enumerated as one of several
forms of development exactions, including the dedication of land, fees in lieu of dedication,
special assessments, and linkages.
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An impact fee as analyzed herein should be distinguished from
other forms of contributions or exactions demanded of developers for
the benefit of local governments such as:
1) A payment for or work actually performed to provide onsite
infrastructure improvements, which are routinely imposed as a con-
dition of subdivision approval.
2) A negotiated exaction that is the result of ad hoc bargaining
between municipalities and developers. (Such exactions usually deal
with specifically delineated improvements directly off-site, such as
traffic lights, turning lanes, and sewer line extensions and are not
related to the broader scope of larger municipal infrastructure over-
burden problems.)
3) A linkage fee that tends to be a financial contribution as-
sessed for broader social purposes such as affordable housing, job
training, child care, mass transit systems and related matters, in re-
turn for municipal governing body approval of new commercial de-
velopment.130 (Such linkage fees have been in place in San Fran-
ciscols' and Boston13 2 for a number of years, and such a proposal
was made in Cleveland'3 3 earlier this year.)
130. Id. (citing Connors & High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From Dedication
to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1987)):
The most recent innovation in the exaction game is known as linkage, a
concept which has catapulted exactions into unprecedented areas. Linkage is re-
ally just another off-site development impact exaction, but it represents a sub-
stantial extension of the exaction continuum. Some jurisdictions require down-
town office developers to construct housing elsewhere or to contribute monies for
the promotion of social programs or policies. For example, a developer may be
required to construct low- and moderate-income housing as a condition prece-
dent to development approval. The rationale for imposing such an obligation on
office developments is that downtown office development brings new employees
to the city. By moving into the city these new employees consequently reduce the
supply of housing available to low- and moderate-income residents who tradi-
tionally live in the city. Thus, in order to mitigate the resulting theoretical hous-
ing shortage, developers are forced to add additional units to the city's housing
inventory. The mandatory underwriting of housing and other social programs by
developers based on the tenuous "link" between retail development and housing
shortages has been the subject of much litigation ....
131. The City of San Francisco enacted a Transit Impact Development Fee (TIDF)
Ordinance in May, 1981. SAN FRANCISCO CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 38.1-38.5 (1981). The ordi-
nance was the subject of extensive litigation in Russ Bldg. Partnership v. San Francisco, 44
Cal. 3d 839, 750 P.2d 324, 244 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1987), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 209 (1989), for
want of a substantial federal question. The California Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the ordinance as a "fair and appropriate mechanism to provide funds for maintaining and
augmenting transportation services." Id. at 844, 750 P.2d at 326, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 684 (quot-
ing San Francisco Planning Comm'ns Resolution No. 8332 (July 26, 1979)). See also San
Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 358-85 (Aug. 18, 1985).
132. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 25 (1983), amended by BOSTON, MASS., ZON-
ING CODE art. 26a (1986).
133. Zolkos, Adverse Impact Feared From Cleveland Linkage, CITY & ST., May 8,
1989, at 10.
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None of the proposals made when the MPC was under consider-
ation attempted to go this far. However, some Pennsylvania munici-
palities have explored whether such fees should be paid to school
systems, arguing that new commercial and residential development
results in increased school population and higher educational ex-
penditures. Since schools in Pennsylvania are governed by separately
elected school boards that do not possess the authority to make land
use decisions under the MPC, such fees, if legally imposed, would
have to be transmitted to school systems under the Intergovernmen-
tal Cooperation Act.1
3 4
During the recent debates over the MPC, the builder/develop-
ment community begrudgingly accepted language that would author-
ize ad hoc exactions for the purpose of supporting a particular pro-
ject's proportionate share of off-site improvements that were
specifically attributable to the demand created by the project." 5 In
134. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 481-490 (Purdon 1974).
135. The language adopted by the House Local Government Committee as § 509(i) of
S. 535, Printer's No. 2428, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (1988), was reported to the floor of the House
in the following form:
The governing body may require a developer, subject to the provisions of
this subsection, as a condition for final plat approval, to construct and dedicate
to the municipality, or municipal authority where appropriate, reasonable and
necessary street improvements, water and sewage line extensions, and storm
water and drainage facilities necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Act of
October 4, 1978 (P.L. 864, No. 167), known as the "Storm Water Management
Act," located outside the property limits of the subdivision or land development
only if such off-site improvements are necessitated by and specifically attributa-
ble to such subdivision or land development or improvements within such subdi-
vision or land development.
(1) Off-site water and sewer line extensions and storm water and drainage
facilities which may be required under this subsection shall not exceed the mini-
mum levels of service, capacity or use necessary to provide adequate service in
accordance with the subdivision or land development ordinance, within such sub-
division or land development, calculated using measurable standards in accor-
dance with generally accepted engineering or planning standards.
(2) The developer and municipality may agree to the payment of fees in
lieu of the construction and dedication of off-site water and sewer line exten-
sions, or storm water and drainage facilities, or both, which may be required
under this subsection, which agreement may include provisions for the time and
manner of payment of such fees and the construction schedule of such
improvements.
(3) If off-site street improvements may be utilized in part by traffic specifi-
cally attributable to the proposed subdivisions or land development and in part
by traffic not specifically attributable to said subdivision or land development,
the municipality may not require the applicant to construct such improvements
but may, notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, require the de-
veloper to pay a fee which shall not exceed that portion of the cost of such street
improvements equal to the percentage that the peak traffic attributable to the
subdivision or land development bears to the maximum peak traffic capacity of
such street improvement at the design level of service existing prior to the pro-
posed subdivision or land development. The calculation of the portion of total
capacity of such street improvements allocable to such subdivision or land devel-
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reviewing these provisions that would be acceptable to developers in
Pennsylvania, it is important to note whether the proposed language
meets the following general legal criteria for valid off-site exaction
ordinances:
(1) that the terms of the ordinance are defined in a rela-
tively unambiguous fashion;
(2) that the funds collected are specifically earmarked for
deposit in a separate clearly identifiable account for the express
purposes of the new improvements;
(3) that the funds collected shall be expended within a rea-
sonable time or returned to the developer;
(4) that the expenditure of funds shall actually benefit the
residents of the new area or development for which contributions
are made; and,
(5) that an express methodology or formula is employed to
determine proportional need caused by the new development." 6
However, this proposed off-site exaction language was amended
on the floor of the House of Representatives on November 16, 1988,
opment shall be calculated hereunder consistent with measurable standards in
accordance with generally accepted traffic engineering standards.
(4) Any fee authorized under this subsection shall, upon its receipt by a
municipality, be deposited in an interest-bearing account, clearly identifying the
specific capital improvements or facilities for which such fee was received. Inter-
est earned on such accounts shall become funds of that account. Funds from
such accounts shall be expended for only properly allocable portions of the in-
curred cost of the construction of the specific improvements or facilities for
which the funds were collected.
(5) Upon request of any person who paid any fees under this subsection, the
municipality shall refund such fee, plus interest accumulated thereon from the
date of payment, if existing facilities are available and service or use is denied;
or, after the fee was collected when service or use was not available, the munici-
pality has failed to commence construction or the improvements or facilities for
which such fees were paid within three years from the date such fees were paid,
or construction has not been completed within five years from the date such fees
were paid. Upon completion of the improvements or facilities, if the actual
amount expended for such construction is less than 95% of the amount properly
allocable to the fee paid hereunder, plus the interest thereon, the municipality
shall refund the difference, including interest, to the person or persons who paid
fees for such improvements.
(6) No off-site improvements or fees in lieu thereof may be required under
this subsection which constitute the expansion, maintenance, repair, replacement
or upgrading of existing facilities or improvements in order to meet stricter effi-
ciency, environmental, regulatory or safety standards for, or to provide better
service to, or meet the needs of, existing development.
(7) No municipality shall have the power to require the construction or
dedication of any improvements of any nature whatsoever or impose any assess-
ment, fee, extraction, or contribution in lieu thereof, except as may be provided
specifically by statute.
S. 535, Printer's No. 2428, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (1988).
136. See Taub, supra note 129, at 533-34.
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
and the builder/development community generally opposed the
broader language, which allegedly granted local government greater
flexibility in the imposition of impact fees.1"7 Advocates for the
builders and developers subsequently succeeded in convincing a ma-
jority of Pennsylvania's senators to excise this broader language
from the final version of the MPC; hence, there remains essentially
no statutory sanction for municipal exactions in the form of impact
fees.
137. This language adopted on the floor of the House as § 509(i) of S. 535, Printer's
No. 2514, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (1988), embodied the following form:
The governing body may require a developer, as a condition for approval of
a subdivision or land development, to pay the cost of providing only reasonable
and necessary transportation improvements, water, sewage and drainage facili-
ties, the rights-of-way and easements therefore, located outside the property lim-
its of the subdivision or land development but necessitated or created and re-
quired thereby. Any municipality which levies, or municipalities which jointly
levy, facility benefit assessment fees, as provided for above, shall first adopt a
facility benefit assessment fee ordinance which shall establish a facility benefit
assessment fee schedule; the basis for the calculation of said fees; the method for
paying the fees; the time at which the fees are to be paid; and the criteria for
credits or refunds of the fees. In addition, the facility benefit assessment fee
ordinance shall:
(1) Assure that the fee charged does not exceed the proportional share of
the reasonably anticipated costs for the public improvements necessitated to sup-
port the new land development activity;
(2) Assure that the fees are based on actual costs;
(3) Provide that any fee schedule developed be based upon empirical data
derived from municipal and/or county studies, in addition to national or com-
monwealth statistics or data relative to daily or peak hour trip generation recrea-
tion usage or other similar standards;
(4) Provide that fees must be used to implement a municipal capital im-
provement plan, recreation plan or provision of an adopted comprehensive plan,
which plan shall be updated and kept current;
(5) Provide that all fees collected shall be deposited into a separate munici-
pal escrow or trust fund account and accounted for separately;
(6) Provide that all fees spent to implement a capital improvement plan,
recreation plan or other municipal plan shall be expended within a reasonable
time not to exceed five years from receipt of said fees at which time any
unexpended fees shall be refunded to the developer or developers that contribute
them;
(7) Provide that the developer paying such fees shall receive credit against
fees due, for the value of any land dedicated to the municipality or for the value
of any such improvements constructed or installed by the developer; and
(8) Provide that fees shall be used to construct or provide municipal facili-
ties at a location which directly or indirectly benefits the development against
which the facility benefit assessment fees were levied. If the governing body re-
quires a developer to pay costs pursuant to this provision, the governing body
shall establish a procedure whereby within five years of completion for the im-
provements, any other developer who applies for subdivision or land development
approval for other lots, tracts or parcels of land benefited by such improvements
shall reimburse the original developer for a proportion of such costs as a condi-
tion for approval of a subdivision on land development application. The amount
of such reimbursement shall be in accordance with the extent of the development
thereof.
S. 535, Printer's No. 2514, 172d Leg., 2d Sess. (1988).
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Therefore, it is generally acknowledged in Pennsylvania that no
specific authority exists in the MPC for the imposition of impact fees
by local government units. 138 Moreover, since both chambers of the
General Assembly considered the grant of express authorization to
municipalities for the enactment of impact fee ordinances, but subse-
quently rescinded that devolution of prerogative, it could reasonably
be argued that the legislative intent was clearly not to extend this
power of exaction to local governments. 139 Proponents of impact fees,
however, argue that the general police power, as exemplified by the
zoning ordinance of a municipality, provides sufficient legal authority
not only for negotiated exactions, but also for impact fees.140 The
power to grant or deny approval of a subdivision is ordinarily the
hammer used by municipalities in the negotiations over exactions.
Although both zoning and subdivision ordinances are authorized by
the MPC, we question whether the authority to grant individual sub-
division requests pursuant to the police power necessarily legitimates
backroom bargaining over the payment of fees unrelated to the cost
of the regulatory process.
There is a dearth of case law in Pennsylvania on the extent to
which a local government may impose either exactions or impact
fees. The authority generally cited by proponents of impact fees is
Robert Mueller Associates v. Zoning Hearing Board of Buffalo
Township. 4" This case involved the township's tentative, conditional
approval of a planned residential development. The trial court ruled
that the township should bear the burden of the cost of off-site
rights-of-way since imposing the acquisition costs of these off-site
138. A political subdivision has only those powers expressly given to it by the legislature.
Guthrie v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 508 Pa. 590, 499 A.2d 570 (1985). A municipality's au-
thority is limited to those powers that are expressly or by necessary implication conferred by
the legislature. Sunny Farms, Ltd. v. North Codurus Township, 81 Pa. Commw. 371, 474
A.2d 56 (1984).
139. Statutory Construction Act, I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be
ascertained by considering the contemporaneous legislative history. The object of all interpre-
tation of laws is to effectuate legislative intent and proper guidance may be obtained by con-
sideration of an act's contemporaneous legislative history. Rossiter v. Whitpain Township, 404
Pa. 201, 202, 170 A.2d 586, 587 (1961). See also McKinley v. Commonwealth of Pa., State
Bd. of Funeral Directors, II Pa. Commw. 241, 246, 313 A.2d 180, 183 (1973) (in interpreting
a legislative delegation of authority, the court must "primarily consider the express language
of the enabling statute, and, where the statute neither affirms nor negates the exercise of au-
thority, the manifest purpose of the legislation can be culled from circumstances surrounding
its enactment and prior legislative history on the same subject.").
140. See Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 17, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (1976).
See also Justice Holmes' aphorism about the petty larceny of the police power in I Holmes-
Larski Letters 457 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
141. 30 Pa. Commw. 386, 373 A.2d 1173 (1977).
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easements upon the developer would be arbitrary and unreasona-
ble."" The township raised this issue on appeal. Although the town-
ship lost the appeal in Mueller,143 the case is cited by proponents of
impact fees because the court, in what was clearly dicta, stated that:
"It is clear that some of the costs of off-site improvements can fairly
be charged to a developer whose plans so burden existing facilities as
to necessitate their accelerated improvement or construction." '144
An exaction or impact fee might arguably be shoe-horned into
the established concept of a special assessment. In Pennsylvania,
however, such specific projects must abut the property assessed and
provide a benefit in direct proportion to the amount charged. The
assessment is special; it is part of a quid pro quo, a payment for a
specific benefit conferred, rather than a tax due for general govern-
ment services.""
Specific language is contained in the new MPC authorizing the
dedication of land for recreation or for the imposition of fees in lieu
of such dedication.1 46 This provision, although initially controversial,
and omitted by the Senate, was reinserted in the bill by the House
Local Government Committee. Neither the House nor the Senate
subjected this section to further amendment during later delibera-
tions. These recreation provisions, as a part of a local subdivision and
land development ordinance, would include:
Provisions requiring the public dedication of land suitable for
142. Id. at 390, 373 A.2d at 1175. The trial court's affirmation of the municipality's
imposition of other conditions involving off-site improvements of streets, water lines, and sew-
age facilities were not appealed by the developer. Id. at 388, 373 A.2d at 1174.
143. Id. at 390, 373 A.2d at 1175.
144. Id. at 389, 373 A.2d at 1175. The Mueller decision -ssentially dealt with limita-
tions placed upon local government in attempting to obtain from a developer virtually all off-
site development costs. "The rationale for imposing off-site costs is not to transfer all costs of
development from municipalities to private developers. The primary responsibility for provid-
ing these services lies with local governments." Id. (emphasis added).
145.
[Tihe grant of power to impose special assessments is perceived as a modi-
fied grant of the taxing power. If the special assessment were narrowly construed
to be a tax used to raise revenues for a general public purpose, it would have to
comply with constitutional limitations on the taxing power. In most states, this
would require that monies raised be spent uniformly throughout the taxing dis-
trict. Special assessments, however, are not applied uniformly and are legally
acceptable for two basic reasons which distinguish them from a tax: (1) they are
used exclusively to finance facilities which provide special benefits in the form of
increased value to the property being assessed and cannot be used to finance
government facilities that benefit the general public; and (2) they must assess
the property owner for the cost of the facilities being financed in proportion to
the benefits he receives from these facilities.
Taub, supra note 129, at 523 (citing Snyder & Stegman, Paying for Growth, Using Develop-
ment Fees to Finance Infrastructure, 45 URB. LAND 35 (1987)).
146. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10509(k) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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the use intended; and, upon agreement with the applicant or de-
veloper, the construction of recreational facilities, the payment
of fees in lieu thereof, the private reservation of the land, or a
combination, for park or recreation purposes as a condition pre-
cedent to final plan approval, provided that:
(i) The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply
to any plan application, whether preliminary or final,
pending at the time of enactment of such provisions.
(ii) The ordinance includes definite standards for
determining the proportion of a development to be dedi-
cated and the amount of any fee to be paid in lieu
thereof.
(iii) The land or fees, or combination thereof, are
to be used only for the purpose of providing park or rec-
reational facilities accessible to the development.
(iv) The governing body has a formally adopted
recreation plan, and the park and recreational facilities
are in accordance with definite principles and standards
contained in the subdivision and land development
ordinance.
(v) The amount and location of land to be dedi-
cated or the fees to be paid shall bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the use of the park and recreational facilities
by future inhabitants of the development or subdivision.
(vi) A fee authorized under this subsection shall,
upon its receipt by a municipality, be deposited in an
interest-bearing account, clearly identifying the specific
recreation facilities for which the fee was received. In-
terest earned on such accounts shall become expended
only in properly allocable portions of the cost incurred
to construct the specific recreation facilities for which
the funds were collected.
(vii) Upon request of any person who paid any fee
under this subsection, the municipality shall refund
such fee, plus interest accumulated thereon from the
date of payment, if the municipality had failed to utilize
the fee paid for the purposes set forth in this section
within three years from the date such fee was paid.
(viii) No municipality shall have the power to re-
quire the construction of recreational facilities or the
dedication of land, or fees in lieu thereof, or private res-
ervation except as may be provided by statute.'47
147. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10503(11) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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Beyond recreation, transportation projects in Pennsylvania may
be financed by special assessments imposed under the authority of
the Transportation Partnership Act.' "a This Act, however, requires
"that each benefitted property within the district, existing and
newly-developed property, be assessed a portion of the cost of the
transportation project."' 9 In Pennsylvania Builders Association v.
East Pennsboro Township,150 the Equity Court held that the assess-
ments levied were invalid because the township limited the special
assessments to undeveloped properties only. Therefore, it is clear
from the holding in East Pennsboro that the Transportation Partner-
ship Act cannot be the bootstrap from which impact fee advocates
can argue the legitimacy of such fees. The legislative findings, pur-
poses, and intent sections of the Transportation Partnership Act, as
well as the East Pennsboro court's interpretation of that language, 151
logically lead in precisely the opposite direction because all proper-
ties, developed and undeveloped, are to be assessed. 52 The legisla-
tion extends to transportation improvements the lawful authority
under which special assessments may be imposed, but the Transpor-
tation Partnership Act should not be read to permit the imposition of
exactions or impact fees upon only new development.
The continued debate in both the halls of the General Assembly
and the courtrooms of the Commonwealth over the propriety and
legality of impact fees and exactions reflects the economic and social
diversity of Pennsylvania. In areas facing strong development pres-
sures, antigrowth sentiment runs strong. 153 Often impact fee and
other ordinances are desired as additional arrows in the quiver of the
no-growth advocates. Some municipalities have conducted extensive,
sophisticated infrastructure studies in order to justify the rationale
behind and defend against challenges to impact fee ordinances. For
example, Manheim Township in Lancaster County recently com-
pleted a comprehensive traffic, water, and sewer study, and an analy-
sis of park and recreational needs as part of an update and revision
of the township's comprehensive plan.154 In 1988, the township en-
148. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1621-26 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
149. Id. at § 1621.1(c).
150. 38 Cumb. L.J. 651 (1988) (emphasis added).
151. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1621-26 (Purdon Supp. 1989); Pennsylvania
Builders Ass'n v. East Pennsboro Township, 38 Cumb. L.J. 651 (1988).
152. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
153. Antigrowth sentiments, clearly expressed in such undisguised comments as "we
want to keep out ticky-tacky $75,000 townhouses," were forcefully put forth at the House
Local Government Committee's public hearing on Senate Bill 535, held at the Bucks County
Courthouse in Doylestown, Pennsylvania on August 17, 1988.
154. Underhill, Enacting an Impact Fee Ordinance, 469 PA. BAR INST. 326, 329 (1988).
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acted an impact fee ordinance in all four of those areas.1 55 Addi-
tional studies were also made of storm water drainage requirements,
police and fire protection requirements, and the burden of develop-
ment on the public schools. 56
At the other end of the spectrum, western Pennsylvania, a less
vibrant economic environment, generally has more subdued pressures
for new development. In those western Pennsylvania communities in
which burgeoning economies are evident, however, impact fees are
contemplated. For instance, Cranberry Township, located in south-
western Butler County, recently enacted an impact fee ordinance."5 7
Moreover, municipalities in the path of the new development ex-
pected due to the expansion of the Greater Pittsburgh International
Airport in the western part of Allegheny County, and individual mu-
nicipalities in which major shopping center investments are contem-
plated, are also reviewing their infrastructure needs and considering
both impact fees and Transportation Partnership Act projects. "
However, much of Pennsylvania, either because of declining ec-
onomic conditions or primarily rural nature, has little potential for
impact fees. Therefore, these Pennsylvania communities exert little
political pressure upon legislators or local public officials to support
impact fee or other exaction legislation. Additionally, despite the rel-
atively robust nature of the downtown economies of Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia, there is scant evidence of any effort to emulate the San
Francisco or Boston experiences'59 with linkage fees or ad hoc exac-
tions. The arguments before the Pennsylvania courts and the Gen-
eral Assembly deal as much with the need for new revenues as with
the desire to stymie growth and development. The political question
most aptly formulated with respect to impact fees and related exac-
tions is as follows:
It is easy to understand the genesis for this type of regula-
tion. After all, elected officials would prefer to tax those who do
not vote. But it is hard to justify this type of requirement as a
matter of law. A decision by a municipal governing body to im-
pose the cost of the new fire house on the new residents, via
zoning regulations, is in effect a taxation decision. While zoning
necessarily has tax implications and an otherwise proper zoning
155. Id.; Manheim Township, Lancaster County, Pa., Ordinance I (Feb. 13, 1989).
156. Id.
157. Cranberry Township, Butler County, Pa., Ordinance 189 (March 2, 1989).
158. The Impact of Impact Fees, Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Feb. 21, 1988, at 8, col. 1-2;
Builders Challenge Cranberry Impact Fee, Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Apr. 12, 1989, at 1, col.
2.
159. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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regulation is not valid on that count, the zoning power is not a
revenue-raising device, and its use to finance public improve-
ments which are not related in the most direct sense to a pro-
posed land development seems an abuse of that power. 6 '
We concur with this analysis. The current Pennsylvania practice
of monetary exactions is questionable, both as a matter of law and as
a matter of public policy. These ad hoc deals possess tremendous
potential for abuse and corruption. Impact fee legislation, which is
based upon studies by planners employed by the municipalities that
desire to enact the ordinances, threatens to subtly disguise
nonuniform taxation. The largess of the federal and state govern-
ments, formerly available to local governments, is now greatly dimin-
ished. The levy of impact fees, a form of taxation without represen-
tation, however, could mitigate the need for certain communities
that lie in the path of development to enhance municipal revenues
through traditional sources.
Impact fees will continue to be judicially challenged on a num-
ber of theories, including: 161
1) The "Dillon's Rule" argument'62 states that since municipal-
ities are limited to those powers that are expressly or impliedly con-
ferred by the legislature, when doubts exist, the courts must resolve
the issue of implied power against local government. 63 Therefore,
pursuant to the Dillon's Rule, courts may hold that, absent specific
authorization in the MPC, municipalities are not authorized to enact
impact fee ordinances and that the ability to assess exactions is ex-
160. 1 R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.3.17 (1981).
161. For a thorough analysis of exactions, impact fees, and linkage fees, and theories for
legal challenge of each, see Delaney, Gordon & Hess, The Need-Nexus Analysis, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROaS. 139, 140 (Winter 1987). See also Lucas, Challenging Impact Fee Ordi-
nances, 469 PA. BAR INST. 334 (1988); Andrew & Merriam, Defensible Linkage, A.P.A. J.,
Spring 1988, at 199.
162. The Dillon Rule derived its name from Judge Dillon, an Iowa jurist who stated in
City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868): "Municipal
corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legisla-
ture. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so
it may destroy." R. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 507-08 (1985).
The Dillon Rule was extended to Pennsylvania.
[The City] is merely an agency instituted by the sovereign for the purpose of
carrying out in detail the objects of government - essentially a revocable
agency - having no vested right to any of its powers or franchises - the char-
ter or act of erection being in no sense a contract with the state - and therefore
fully subject to the control of the legislature, who may enlarge or diminish its
territorial extent or its functions, may change or modify its internal arrange-
ments, or destroy its very existence, with the mere breath of arbitrary discretion
City of Phila. v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 (1870) (opinion of Justice Sharswood).
163. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
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tremely narrow and limited.16'
2) Even if the appropriate delegation of authority has been pin-
pointed, the local ordinance must establish a rational nexus between
the fee imposed and the infrastructure burden created.0 5 If such a
rational nexus can be established through credible studies of infra-
structure needs, the imposition of the fee would not be arbitrary and
unreasonable. 166 The rational nexus test requires that an imposed fee
bear a reasonable relationship to the benefits received by the occu-
pants of the development paying the fee. This test appears to have
guided the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 67 Under Nollan, by ra-
tional nexus analysis, the municipality must establish that the regu-
latory act substantially advances a compelling state interest, and,
moreover, that the fee is proportionate to the burden created." 8
In commenting upon Mueller and the rational nexus theory, one
commentator pointed to the danger of "unwritten" requirements that
"open the door to favoritism, and to attempts by municipalities to
frustrate proper but unwanted development, by heaping conditions
upon it."'69 This appears to argue against the ad hoc exaction or at
least requires precise analysis of the proportionality of the fee and its
specifically attributable impact upon the new development. The com-
mentator concluded that "simple equity - and predictability - ar-
gue strongly in favor of a requirement that the municipality write
down - and enact - those conditions which it intends to impose
164. Statutes like the Transportation Partnership Act and the Business Improvement
District Act of 1967 provide no comfort for impact fee advocates because these special assess-
ment enabling acts require that such assessments be levied against benefitted properties, both
developed and undeveloped properties. See Transportation Partnership Act, 53 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1621-26 (Purdon Supp. 1989); Business Improvement District Act of 1967, 53
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1551-54 (Purdon 1974).
165. Rober* Mueller Assocs. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Buffalo Township, 30 Pa.
Commw. 386, 390 nII, 373 A.2d 1173, 1175 n.1 (1977). Under the rational nexus test, "a
developer can only be forced to 'bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational nexus to
the needs created by, and benefits conferred upon, the subdivision.'" Id. (quoting 181 Inc. v.
Salem County Planning Bd., 133 N.J. Super. 350, 358, 366 A.2d 501, 506 (1975)). The ra-
tional nexus test is "[tihe test of judicial scrutiny now employed in the majority of jurisdic-
tions to determine an exaction's constitutionality .... " Taub, supra note 129, at 530-33.
166. See Angell & Shorter, Impact Fees: Private-sector Participation in Infrastructure
Financing, GOV'T FIN. REV., Oct. 1988, at 19; James B. Duncan, Impact Fees (Oct. 26, 1987)
(unpublished memorandum presented at the 1987 Annual Conference of the Pennsylvania
Planning Association, Monroeville, Pennsylvania) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review
office).
167. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). See also, PA. Local Gov't Comm'n, An Analysis, United
States Supreme Court Decisions (1987) [hereinafter Analysis] (copy on file at Dickinson Law
Review office).
168. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145-48 (1987).
169. 2 R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.2.13 (1981).
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upon subdivision."" 0 Therefore, potential challenges must raise the
thresh6ld issue. First, the appropriate and precise power must be del-
egated by the General Assembly. Second, the power must be exer-
cised in a fashion rationally related to the burdens imposed by the
new development.
3) Aside from the admittedly brief and oversimplified analysis
of the rational nexus challenge to an ordinance's validity, other
traditional constitutional attacks, based upon denial of procedural
due process or equal protection, will also be advanced.
Since many of the recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, which culminated with Nollan, arose in California state
courts, many commentators have pointed to the relatively unique as-
pects of California law and the deferential treatment accorded gov-
ernment regulators under California judicial standards.17 1 California
courts, rather than applying the rational nexus test, broadly interpret
constitutional provisions to support local authority for virtually limit-
less development exactions under the reasonable relationship test. 72
The California rule "sometimes called the 'anything goes' test .. .
[constitutes a] loose standard of reasonableness . . [giving] consid-
erable deference to the local government, thereby presenting an al-
most insurmountable obstacle for a developer to overcome. '173
Noting that the Nollan legacy will dictate "more disciplined
and reasonable regulatory conduct" on the part of municipal offi-
cials, Attorney Robert K. Best cautioned that "to suggest that the
ramification of the Nollan decision will fall only on California ...
[constitutes] a dangerous oversimplification of the holding of the
case."' 74 Mr. Best's advice to local officials nationwide was based
upon his conclusion that "the justification now required for an exac-
tion is different and the nature of judicial review of any exaction has
170. Id.
171. See Analysis, supra note 167, at 2-4.
172. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 826, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
173. Taub, supra note 129, at 528-29 (citing Debney, Gordon & Hess, The Needs-
Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and
Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Winter 1987)). Taub noted that "a majority of
courts have rejected this test ... [the validity of which] may also be in doubt in light of the
United States Supreme Court's recent Nollan decision, which held that in order for an exac-
tion to be valid, it must be related to a specific, justifiable public purpose." Taub, supra note
129, at 529.
174. Best, The Supreme Court Becomes Serious About Takings Law: Nollan Sets New
Rules for Exactions, 10 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 153, 157-59 (1987). Mr. Best, Chief of
Property Rights Litigation for the Pacific Legal Foundation, represented James and Marilyn
Nollan in the landmark Nollan litigation and argued the case before the United States Su-
preme Court.
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changed."'176 Therefore, Mr. Best suggested that diligence and cau-
tion should guide local land use regulators in the preparation of a
comprehensive, detailed record supporting the substantive aspects of
the rationale underlying the imposition of impact fees and other ex-
actions. Furthermore, the record must be devoid of "factually erro-
neous conclusions and subjective, political decisions."
'"76
In order to properly advise clients, solicitors for Pennsylvania's
municipal governing bodies, planning commissions, and zoning hear-
ing boards have been deluged with cautionary messages relating to
Nollan. At the date of this writing, at least five legal actions chal-
lenging local powers of exaction were being pursued. This estimate
includes the previously mentioned Cranberry and Manheim Town-
ship matters in Butler and Lancaster Counties, respectively. The ar-
guments most likely to be successful in these suits are the delegation
of appropriate state authority issue, and the substantive due process
challenge implicit in the takings and rational nexus analysis. Solici-
tors and local officials can defend a rational nexus attack through
careful planning, expert studies, and the preparation of a detailed
record of the proceedings. 177 Additionally, restraint should be exer-
cised to avoid politically motivated inclinations to employ land use
regulatory schemes "to snare convenient prey on which to load
whatever costs the unfortunate captive [is] able to bear.' 1 78 These
caveats, therefore, should be given careful thought prior to local ac-
tion that could drain municipal coffers through protracted litigation.
The delegation issue, however, will only be ultimately resolved
by an act of the General Assembly that squarely authorizes the
power to impose impact fees or exactions. In the 1987-88 legislative
session, the builder/developer coalition was successful in excluding
all reference to impact fee authorization in the proposed bill. A rela-
tively restrained proposal dealing primarily with exactions for off-site
improvements, 79 supported by the House Local Government Com-
mittee, was rejected on the House floor and a broader amendment
permitting impact fees, offered by Representative A. Carville Foster,
175. Id. at 158.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 159.
178. Id.
179. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. More narrowly drafted legislation ap-
plying the strict, "specifically and uniquely attributable to" language was introduced in the
1988-89 legislative session at the request of the Pennsylvania Builders Association. See S. 923,
Printer's No. 1052, 173d Leg., Ist Sess. (1989) (introduced by Sen. J. Doyle Corman); H.R.
1361, Printer's No. 1582, 173d Leg., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Rep. John Wozniak).
These bills also amend the tap-in fee provisions of the Municipalities Authorities Act, 53 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 301-401 (Purdon 1974).
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was adopted, but ultimately deleted from the final version of the re-
vised MPC. 80
The Foster proposal, reintroduced in the General Assembly's
1989 session, 8' permits the governing body to require a developer, as
a condition for approval of a subdivision or land development, to pay
"facility benefit assessment fees." The bill prescribes that a facility
benefit assessment fee ordinance be enacted and requires significant
effort by the municipality to ensure that the fee is rational and pro-
portional to the burdens imposed by the development. 82 For exam-
ple, the bill requires that the ordinance establish a fee schedule, out-
line the basis for the calculation of the fee, and mandate a method
for payment of the fees. 8 ' The Foster bill also requires the follow-
ing: a municipal capital improvement plan, a separate municipal es-
crow or trust fund account, all fees be spent to implement the plan,
developers receive credit against fees due for the value of the land
dedicated or improvements constructed, and a procedure whereby
within five years of the completion of mandated improvements any
other developer whose proposal would benefit from the improvement
reimburse the original developer on a proportionate basis.""
This impact fee proposal, which was considered late in the
1987-88 session within the context of Senate Bill 535, l85 died in an
acrimonious atmosphere created by the heated debate and political
machinations emanating from the local tax reform battle. The bill's
reintroduction in the 1989-90 legislative session in a more serene leg-
islative and political climate will not, however, insure its passage.
Legislators' votes on this issue are dictated more by the extent of
growth and development pressures within their home districts than
by any concerns relative to partisan or ideological predilections.
Land use control is normally not a party issue. Frenetic growth in
the suburban Philadelphia counties of the southeastern corner of the
Commonwealth influenced the House vote on impact fees last ses-
sion, and we believe the same resolution may eventuate this session.
Therefore, it is our prediction that competing forces in the Gen-
eral Assembly will continue to neutralize each other because each
180. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
181. H.R. 649, Printer's No. 717, 173d Leg., Ist Sess. (1989) (introduced by Rep. A.
Carville Foster, Jr.).
182. Id. at § 509(i)(1).
183. Id. at § 509(i). Moreover, the bill requires that the ordinance specifically address
proportionality, the accuracy of the cost estimated, and the empirical data utilized. Id. at §
509(i)(I)-(3).
184. Id. at § 509(i)(4)-(8).
185. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
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side would rather run the risk and incur the expense of litigation at
this stage than make major concessions. Since no appellate court de-
cision of broad precedential value has been handed down to date,
neither faction is willing to capitulate on any legislative proposal.
Moreover, the builders/developers and the local government associa-
tions joined by certain no-growth advocates, are driven by the inter-
nal political imperatives that mandate satisfaction of constituencies
and are not compelled by any outside force to compromise.
A well-reasoned appellate court decision, however, with broad
applicability based on the facts and legal principles at issue, would
dramatically change this prognosis. If it appears that the authority
to impose impact fees or related exactions through locally enacted
ordinances is implied in the general police powers, the builders/de-
velopers would want legislation to strictly construe and specifically
limit that power. If the police power does not permit such ordi-
nances, then municipalities lying in the path of development will
urge some action by the legislature to statutorily authorize exactions
designed to force contributions by the development community to lo-
cal infrastructure improvements.
Given the relatively conservative nature of the Pennsylvania
courts on these issues, we believe that challenges to current ordi-
nances may be sustained. In that event, the builder/development
forces would have leverage to either prevent the passage of any im-
pact fee bill or to drastically restrict the scope of authorization pre-
sent in such a bill. Therefore, by excising the limited authority origi-
nally granted in Senate Bill 535, and substituting the broader impact
fee language espoused by members who represent communities with
growing pains, local government/no-growth forces may experience a
pyrrhic victory if House Bill 649 is passed. In our opinion, it is un-
likely that the General Assembly will grant broader powers than
those included in the Local Government Committee version of Sen-
ate Bill 535. It is equally unlikely that courts will find the ability to
tax new residents implicit in the police power of municipal
governments.
VIII. Conclusion
The General Assembly and Governor Robert P. Casey signifi-
cantly improved, streamlined, and clarified the statute authorizing
local government regulation of land use. Pennsylvania has not cho-
sen, as have other states, to move such decision making to the state
level. Although the new Act significantly embodies new concepts,
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many communities in Pennsylvania have no zoning, and few Penn-
sylvania communities have a comprehensive plan for local land use
development and control. The search for new revenues will lead some
localities-those who happen to be in the path of develop-
ment-toward land use regulation as a tool for revenue generation.
The vast majority of municipalities, however, will enter the twenty-
first century with only limited new sophistication in the land use reg-
ulation area.
For many cities and suburban communities, the new procedures
of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code are welcome. Im-
pact fees, however, are only of marginal relevance. Zoning and other
land use regulation will come slowly to rural Pennsylvania, and will
be driven by the need for revenues or the desire to keep out un-
desirables, including classes of people who are disliked 186 and un-
pleasant landfills. These reasons, revenues and exclusions, are sus-
pect. Skirmishes over the revised MPC, disguised in complicated
jargon, will really be about such questions. As the new MPC is im-
plemented, fundamental rights"8 7 will still be at issue everywhere
from the local zoning hearing board, to the General Assembly, and
to the Pennsylvania appellate courts.
186. The "insidious by-product of exactions earns it the label as the latest sheepskin for
the wool of exclusionary zoning." Siemon, Who Bears the Cost?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
115, 126 (1987).
187. Such fundamental rights include the traditional property and civil rights, and the
right to travel within the nation.
Jobs created in a major metropolitan area in significant numbers draw peo-
ple into the metroplex. This movement often reflects opportunity for residents of
depressed and declining regions to pull up stakes in search of prosperity. I hope
we never witness a rebirth of the Grapes of Wrath mentality of walling out
neighbors and fellow citizens, of discouraging the great migrations that have
been our strength.
Misuraca, Summation, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 170 (Winter 1987).
